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Okanga*
Abstract
Intangibles play an important role in the processes of many business enterprises. They facilitate
value creation and enhance the profitability of businesses that deploy them. They are also valuable
assets that can be traded in themselves, although their appropriate values are often difficult to
ascertain. As such, studies show that transactions in intangibles also provide opportunities for
profit shifting by multinational enterprises through transfer (mis)pricing; a situation that deprives
source states of due and sometimes significant tax revenue. This situation has over time triggered
both unilateral and concerted responses by states anxious to cauterize this conduit of revenue
bleeding. Through analysis of relevant legislation, case law, policy documents and opinions, this
paper examines the recent measures applied by Nigeria to regulate the transfer pricing of
intangibles, evaluating the legal and administrative challenges confronting Nigeria as a developing
country seeking to enforce the complex arm’s length principle of transfer pricing. Because the
subject is of global character, the author relies on both Nigerian and foreign sources, including
various OECD/UN initiatives.
1.

Introduction
Such is the character of a village, or, since electric media, such is also the character of
global village. And it is the advertising and PR community that is most aware of this
basic new dimension of global interdependence.1

When Marshall McLuhan penned those famous words, he was not writing about taxation, in any
sense. Rather he was acknowledging the burgeoning power of the ‘new media,’ its stupendous
capacity to shape the world as a closely interactive unit and to influence life in a global sense. The
advertising and PR community, apparently, were the first to truly appreciate this emergent power,
and, thus, to deploy it to their advantage. McLuhan’s words may in another sense be used to
conceptualize the inherent potential of intangible property and how Multinational enterprises
(MNEs) play a prominent role, not just in their development, but also in using these kinds of hardto-understand and hard-to-value property to artificially determine their commercial fortunes or
bottom-line. Put differently, McLuhan’s words may illustrate the way MNEs operate and the crossborder impact of their operations. Such impact may be economic, social, political, environmental
and, of course, fiscal. From a fiscal perspective, it may be used to reflect the notion that MNEs
paper-shift revenue across country lines to influence their tax obligations, a practice that has placed
MNEs under a microscope of deepening suspicion, if not contempt. Worldwide, there is a growing
concern that governments are losing substantial corporate tax revenue because of tax planning by
MNEs (taking advantage of weak international tax rules and processes) aimed at shifting profits
*
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1
Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1962) at 21.
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in ways that erode the taxable base to locations where they are subject to a more favourable tax
treatment.2 Tax havens and profit shifting by MNEs have, thus, been receiving increasing attention
from researchers, policymakers and the media alike, as documented by recent studies.3 This greater
attention is in part because it has become rather easy for MNEs to avoid paying corporate tax, but
also, in part thanks to recent leaks of confidential documents and thorough investigative case
studies.4 In 2016, for instance, a study by the European Parliamentary Research Service revealed
that various powerful MNEs, including Google, Amazon, Apple, Ikea, Gap, Microsoft and
Starbucks, were involved in corporate tax-dodging, costing the EU between US$54.5 billion and
US$76.4 billion a year. Companies allegedly achieved this tax avoidance by artificially allocating
their profits economically derived in Europe to low-tax countries like Ireland and Luxembourg.5
According to a 2013 research study conducted by the African Development Bank and Global
Financial Integrity (GFI), between 1980 and 2009, African economies lost between US$597 billion
and US$1.4 trillion in net resources.6 This monumental bleeding was primarily effected through
transfer mispricing.7According to a 2015 report by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa, Africa is losing approximately US$50 billion per year in illicit financial flows (IFFs).
Transfer mispricing is one of the primary sources of these losses.8 The report specifically identifies
the “misinvoicing” of services and intangibles as widespread means to effect IFFs from Africa and
Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, “Transfer Pricing and Debt Shifting in Multinationals” (2013) Norwegian
School of Economics CESifo Working Paper No. 4381, online:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2319873, at 2. See also Allison Christians, “Drawing the
Boundaries of Tax Justice,” in Kim Brooks, ed, The Quest for Tax Reform Continues: The Royal Commission on
Taxation Fifty Years Later (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) 53; Kimberly A Clausing “The Effect Of Profit Shifting On The
Corporate Tax Base In The United States And Beyond,” (2016) 69:4 National Tax J 905; Annet Wanyana Oguttu,
“Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa – Part 1: What Should Africa’s Response be to the OECD BEPS
Action Plan?” (2015) 48:3 The Comp & Intl LJ of Southern Africa 516; Allison Christians & Laurens van Apeldoorn,
“Taxing Income Where Value Is Created,” (2018) 22:1 Florida Tax Rev 1; Tarcisio Diniz Magalhães, “What Is Really
Wrong with Global Tax Governance and How to Properly Fix It,” 10:4 (2018) WTJ 499; Aguguom Theophilus
Anaekenwa & Olaoye Samuel, “A Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting through Transfer Pricing: Evidence from
Nigeria,” (2017) 6:1 Apex J Business Administration and Management Sciences Research 1; Antony Ting and Sidney
J Gray, “The Rise of the Digital Economy: Rethinking the Taxation of Multinational Enterprises” (2019) J Intl
Business Studies 1; Thomas Rixen, "Tax Competition and Inequality: The Case for Global Tax Governance" (2011)
17:4 Global Governance 447.
3
See Petr Janský & Miroslav Palanský, “Estimating the Scale of Profit Shifting and Tax Revenue Losses Related to
Foreign Direct Investment,” 26:5 Intl Tax and Public Finance J 1048.
4
Ibid at 1049.
5
Jonathan Chew, “7 Corporate Giants Accused of Evading Billions in Taxes,” Fortune Magazine (11 March, 2016),
online: https://fortune.com/2016/03/11/apple-google-taxes-eu/
6
African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity, “Illicit Financial Flows and the Problem of Net Resource
Transfers
from
Africa:
1980-2009”
(2013),
online:https://secureservercdn.net/45.40.149.159/34n.8bd.myftpupload.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/gfi_afdb_iffs_and_the_problem_of_net_resource_transfers_from_africa_1980-2009highres.pdf?time=1571932270
7
Shafi'U Abubakar Kurfi et al, “Transfer Pricing and the Regulations in Nigerian Milieu” (2017) 1:1 Indian J Finance
and Banking 33 at 35.
8
Africa, AUC/UNECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, High Level Panel
on
Illicit
Financial
Flows
from
Africa,
Illicit
Financial
Flows
(2015),
online:
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf
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acknowledges that while there is increasing awareness of the use of intangibles for IFFs, existing
tools do not seem to provide the required solutions.9 Available data report that over-invoicing of
imports and under-invoicing of exports represents a substantial source of transfer pricing and
capital flight in Nigeria, with an average annual outflow of capital running to the tune of US$386
million and cumulative total of US$13.5 billion over the 1970-2004 period.10 Between the periods
of 2005 and2007, Nigeria lost £502 million in transfer pricing via trade ‘misinvoicing.’11 The role
of transfer mispricing, in the gargantuan revenue leaks highlighted above cannot be overstated.
Moreover, even where there is no intention to misprice, arriving at an appropriate transfer price
may be a complex task particularly because of the difficulty in identifying and valuing intangibles
transferred and/or services provided.12 This state of affairs makes it an absolute necessity for tax
authorities to keep a close eye on controlled transactions. The global disaffection with the
egregious revenue haemorrhage and the need for an effective legal and policy framework to
address these shortfalls have been some of the drivers of 21st Century international tax reform
efforts. A key coordinating forum for these efforts has been the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has attempted to develop functional legal and
policy frameworks through its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. For instance,
Action 8 of the OECD’s Action Plan on BEPS, published in July 2013, specifically addresses
transfer pricing issues relating to controlled transactions involving intangibles.13
Nigeria is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS and has participated in the
multilateral anti-BEPS project, including the adoption/domestication of rules and procedures
developed at that forum, such as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations14 and the OECD Guidance on the Implementation of
Country-by-Country Reporting.15 In March 2018 Nigeria’s Federal Inland Revenue Service
(FIRS) issued the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations 2018 (TPR18 or the TP
Regulations).16 TPR18 repealed and replaced the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations 2012
9

Ibid at 31.
Taiwo Ajilore, “An Economic Analysis of Capital Flight from Nigeria” (2010) 2:4 Intl J Economics and Finance
89 at 92.
11
Christian Aid, “False Profits: Robbing the Poor to Keep the Rich Tax Free” (2009),online:
https://www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-08/false-profits-robbing-the-poor-to-keep-rich-tax-freemarch-2009.pdf at 5.
12
UN Tax Committee’s Subcommittee on Practical Transfer Pricing Issues, Background Paper, Working Draft,
online: https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/20110607_TP_Chapter1_Introduction.pdf, at 4, para
1.9 [UN Tax Committee].
13
OECD,
“Action
Plan
on
Base
Erosion
and
Profit
Shifting”
(2013),
online:
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf
14
OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations” (2017), online:
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/oecd-transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-and-taxadministrations_20769717. [OECD TP Guidelines]
15
OECD, “Guidance on the Implementation of Country-by-Country Reporting” (2018), online:
http://www.oecd.org/tax/guidance-on-the-implementation-of-country-by-country-reporting-beps-action-13.pdf
16
The FIRS also issued the Income Tax (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 2018 (CBCR) to try to address
the problem of information asymmetry between the tax authority and taxpayers by requiring MNEs in Nigeria to
declare their group capital, labour, revenue and tax statuses on a yearly basis. This Regulation serves to provide the
10

3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571153

(TPR12), introducing some notable updates to the transfer pricing regulatory framework in
Nigeria. The pricing of intangibles is one of the key areas of reform. In the segments that follow,
I examine the provisions of TPR18 that I consider relevant to the pricing of intangibles and the
challenges that Nigeria may encounter in trying to effect these reforms; and also reflect on what
Nigeria may to do try to enhance the workability of the rules. The remaining part of this paper is
divided into two. In section 2, I discuss the concept of transfer pricing and distinguish it from
transfer mispricing. In section 3 I discuss the regulation of transfer pricing through the arm’s length
principle and the challenges of applying the existing rules to transactions in intangibles.
2.

Transfer Pricing: Overview

Transfer pricing is the general term for the pricing of cross-border, intra-firm transactions between
related parties.17 It refers to the setting of prices for transactions between associated enterprises
involving the transfer of property or services. These transactions are also referred to as “controlled”
transactions, as distinct from “uncontrolled” transactions between companies that are not
associated and can be assumed to operate independently (“on an arm’s length basis”) in setting
terms for such transactions.18 Such term setting is in itself not necessarily illegal or abusive. What
is illegal or abusive is transfer mispricing, which is also known as transfer pricing manipulation or
abusive transfer pricing.19 In other words, transfer pricing does not necessarily involve tax avoidance, as the need to set prices is a normal aspect of how MNEs must operate.20 Broadly speaking,
the two possible objectives of transfer pricing are: performance evaluation and cost
minimization.21 Performance evaluation means evaluating the performance of both parties on an
intercompany transaction. That is to say, the transfer should be made at a price acceptable to both
parties. This could be determined by reference to outside market prices or by negotiation between
the parties to the transaction.22 Regarding cost minimization, differences between countries in
respect of intercompany transactions across national borders might give an MNE the desire to
control costs through the discretionary determination of transfer prices by the headquarters.23
A significant volume of global trade consists of international transfers of goods and services,
capital (such as money) and intangibles (such as intellectual property) within an MNE group; such
transfers are called “intra-group transactions.” There is evidence that intra-group trade is growing
steadily and arguably accounts for more than 30 percent of all international transactions. In

FIRS relevant information for transfer pricing purposes, although the information cannot be used as a basis for making
transfer pricing adjustments. See regulations 3, 4, 8-10 of the CBCR.
17
United Nations, “Transfer Pricing Manual for Developing Countries” (2017) at 2, para B.1.1.6 [UN TP Manual].
18
Ibid.
19
Lee Sheppard, “Transfer Pricing” Tax Justice Network (2012), online: https://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporatetax/transfer-pricing/
20
UN TP Manual supra note 17, para B.1.1.7.
21
Timothy Doupnik & Hector Perera, International Accounting, 3rd ed (New York, Mc-Graw Hill, 2012) at 591.
22
Ibid at 593.
23
Ibid. Other cost minimization objectives might include avoidance of withholding taxes, minimization of import
duties, circumvention of profit repatriation restrictions, protection of cash flows from currency devaluation and
improvement of competitive position of foreign operations. See Doupnik & Perera ibid at 595.
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addition, transactions involving intangibles and multi-tiered services constitute a rapidly growing
proportion of an MNE’s commercial transactions and have greatly increased the complexities
involved in analyzing and understanding such transactions.24 These complexities can be
categorized into jurisdiction, allocation and valuation.25 Jurisdictional issues border on which
country should tax the MNE’s income and the resolution of that question especially where more
than one country claims that right.26 Allocation issues require the consideration of two conflicting
perspectives: the MNE’s perspective and the government’s perspective. The MNEs aim to allocate
their resources, especially taxable profits, with maximum efficiency, whereas for the government,
the allocation of costs and income from the MNEs resources needs to be addressed to compute the
tax judiciously.27 Sometimes these diverse perspectives result in a tug-of-war between the
countries in the allocation of costs and resources in the hope towards maximizing the tax base in
their respective states.28 The third issue deals with the valuation of intra-firm transfers. This simply
means that the mere allocation of income and expenses to one or more members of the MNEs
group is insufficient. The income and expenses must also be valued.29 Where the pricing does not
accord with internationally applicable norms or with the arm’s length principle under domestic
law, the tax administration may consider this to be “mis-pricing”, “incorrect pricing”, “unjustified
pricing” or non-arm’s length pricing, and issues of tax avoidance and evasion may potentially
arise.30 It is in this negative context that transfer pricing connotes the artificial manipulation of
internal prices within an MNE, with the intention of creating a tax advantage.31 This brings us to
the subject of combating transfer mispricing.
3.
Tackling Transfer Mispricing (in Nigeria)
Nigeria did not have a comprehensive legal framework to combat transfer mispricing until 2012.32
Neither was there guidance on how taxpayers could comply with or demonstrate that their relatedparty transactions complied with the arm's-length principle.33 Prior to the issuance of the Income
Tax (Transfer Pricing Regulations 2012 (‘TPR12’) the most that taxpayers and tax administrators
could refer to were general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) contained in various statutes and Double

24

UN Tax Committee supra note 12, paras 1.3–1.4
Ibid, para 2.
26
Ibid.
27
Kurfi et al, supra note 7 at 35.
28
Ibid, para 35
29
UN TP Manual supra note 17, para B.1.2.11.
30
Ibid, para B.1.1.7.
31
Lynne Oats, Angharad Miller & Emer Mulligan, Principles of International Taxation, 6th ed (London: Bloomsbury,
2017) at 412.
32
This delayed arrival may, in theory, be traced to two factors. First, for decades, Nigeria relied heavily on revenue
from her oil and gas sector, with little effort to mobilise the tools of taxation to source alternative revenue. In the past
decade or so – mostly in the last half-a-decade – there has been far greater emphasis on tax revenue, especially given
the global fall in oil prices. Nigeria’s Federal Inland Revenue Service regularly posts huge revenue collection targets.
Second, it cannot be ignored that the period around 2012 is also noted for the prominence of the global BEPS
awakening which has spurred many countries to try to reshape their international tax mechanisms.
33
Joshua Bamfo, Amaka Samuel-Onyeani & Abisola Agboola, “Understanding the Transfer Pricing Audit Process in
Nigeria,” (2016) 84 Tax Notes Intl 501 [Bamfo, Samuel-Onyeani & Agboola]
25
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Taxation Treaties.34 For instance, paragraph 13(2)(d) of the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA),35
provides that:
The profits of a company other than a Nigerian company from any trade or business shall be
deemed to be derived from Nigeria where the trade or business or activities is between the
company and another person controlled by it or which has a controlling interest in it and
conditions are made or imposed between the company and such person in their commercial
or financial relations which in the opinion of the Board is deemed to be artificial or fictitious,
so much of the profit adjusted by the Board to reflect the arm’s length transaction.36
This situation changed in 2012 with the issuance of TPR12 which was subsequently replaced by
TPR18. The TP Regulations seek to, inter alia, ensure that Nigeria is able to tax on an appropriate
taxable basis corresponding economic activities deployed by taxable persons in Nigeria, including
their transactions and dealing with related persons; and provide the Nigerian tax authorities with
the tools to fight tax evasion that may arise through over or under pricing of transactions between
related persons.37 The Regulations govern transactions between “connected persons” including the
transfer, purchase, license or use of intangible assets.38
3.1

The Arm’s Length Principle

The TP Regulations require that transactions between connected persons be conducted in a manner
that is consistent with the arm’s length standard (ALS) or arm’s length principle (ALP). 39 A
controlled transaction is at arm’s length if the conditions of the transaction do not differ from the
conditions that would have applied between independent persons in comparable transactions
carried out under comparable circumstances.40 Where a connected person fails to comply with the
ALP, the tax authority may make adjustments to bring the transaction in compliance therewith.41
Basically, the ALS attempts to impose the realities of similar transactions amongst unrelated
parties on intra-group transactions.42 As such, the ALS was conceived as a system that requires
connected persons to set the prices of their transactions in a similar manner as independent parties
in comparable transactions. ALS, therefore, consists of comparing intra-group transactions to open
market transactions and taxing them accordingly. Transfer pricing leads to various adjustments in
See Lolade Ososami, Joseph Eimunjeze & Mojisola Jawando, “Nigeria” in Steve Edge & Dominic Robertson, eds,
The Transfer Pricing Reviews, 3rd ed (London: Law Business Research, 2019) 195.
35
Companies Income Tax Act 1961, Cap C21, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, as amended [CITA].
36
For a similar DTA provision, see Article 9 of the Nigeria-Canada Income Tax Treaty, 4 August 1992, E102399 CTS 1999 No. 48. For a relevant GAAR prescription, see section 22 of the CITA ibid.
37
See regulation 2 of TPR18.
38
See paragraph 3(1)(c) of TPR18. Regulation 12 specifies that persons are deemed ‘connected’ where one person
has the ability to control or influence the other person in making financial, commercial or operational decisions.
39
These acronyms are used interchangeably in this paper.
40
Sub-regulation 4(2).
41
Sub-regulation 4(3).
42
Zachée Pouga Tinhaga, "From Avoiding ‘Double Taxation’ Yesterday to Avoiding ‘Double Non-Taxation’ Today:
The Urgent Need for an International Tax Regime Based on Unitary Tax Principles" (SJD Dissertation, University of
Michigan Law, 2006), online: https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=sjd, at
129.
34
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the event the intra-group pricing does not agree with the independent parties’ open market
transactions.43
The ALP is contained in both the OECD and UN Transfer Pricing models and its methods are
enshrined in Nigerian law by TPR18. The Regulations incorporate five methods for attaining an
arm’s length pricing. Sub-regulation 5(1) provides that:
In determining whether the result of a transaction or series of transactions are consistent with
the arm’s length principle, one of the following transfer pricing methods shall be applied(i) the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (‘CUP’) method;
(ii) the Resale Price method;
(iii) the Cost Plus method;
(iv) the Transactional Net Margin method;
(v) the Transactional Profit Split method; or
(vi) any other method which may be prescribed by Regulations made by the Service from
time to time.
I briefly discuss these methods below.
3.1.1 Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method
The first transfer pricing method prescribed in TPR18 is the Comparable Uncontrolled Price
(“CUP”).44 Under this method, the transaction between the related parties is compared to a
transaction in the same good or service, in the same market, under similar conditions, but between
unrelated parties. The CUP method is only useful if the goods or services are standard enough that
they can be found in the open market.45 There is a requirement that the comparable be close to the
actual transaction if not identical to the actual transaction except that it is occurring between
unrelated parties unlike the actual transaction which is between related parties.46 CUP is reliable
where none of the differences (if any) between the transactions being compared or between the
enterprises undertaking those transactions could materially affect the price in the open market; or
reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of such
differences.47 If such comparable is found, the transfer price is adjusted to the price in the
comparable transaction and taxed accordingly.
3.1.2 Resale Price method
The Resale Price Method (“RPM”) evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled
transaction is at arm’s length, by reference to the gross margin realized in comparable uncontrolled

43

Ibid, 129
Regarded, alongside the resale price method and the cost plus method, as one of the three traditional methods is
(one of three the traditional methods). See Tinhaga ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
See Mbiki Kamanjiri, “Welcome to Transfer Pricing,” Grant Thornton (2017) online: https://www.icpak.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/Welcome-to-Transfer-Pricing-by-Mbiki-Kamanjiri.pdf
44
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transactions.48 Under this method, the arm’s length price is measured by subtracting an appropriate
gross profit from the applicable resale price of the property involved in the controlled transaction.
RPM uses comparable profitability, and comparable profitability is determined by calculating the
ratio of the initial purchase price of comparable tangible goods to their resale price to an unrelated
party. This ratio (expressed as a percentage) is then used to calculate the value of the goods in a
related-party transaction.
3.1.3 Cost Plus Method
The cost-plus method compares gross margins of controlled and uncontrolled transactions. Under
this method, the arm’s length price is measured by adding an “appropriate” gross profit to the
controlled taxpayer’s cost of producing the property involved in the controlled transaction. Under
Cost Plus, the amount needed to produce is added to the prevalent profit margin (from uncontrolled
transactions) to determine the arm’s length transfer price.49
3.1.4 Transactional Net Margin Method
The fourth transfer pricing method is the Comparable Profits Method (“CPM”) which is also
known as the Transactional Net Margin Method (“TNMM”). This method evaluates whether the
amount charged in a controlled transaction is at arm’s length by comparing the profitability of one
of the parties to the controlled transaction (the “tested party”) to that of companies that are similar
to the tested party.50 Application of this method entails assembling a sample of standalone
companies that are similar to the tested party principally in terms of resources employed and risks
assumed. Unaffiliated firms need only perform broadly similar functions and operate in broadly
similar product markets as the tested party.51 The analysis of the reasonably similar industries
provides a range of prices allowing for a curve where the bottom 25% and the top 25% of the curve
are excluded. If the profits realized on the controlled transaction fall within the middle 50%, no
further analysis is required. However, if the related parties’ transaction does not fall within the
middle 50%, then the tax authority can make adjustments.52
3.1.5 Transactional Profit Split Method (TPSM)
The TPSM allocates operating profits or losses from controlled transactions in proportion to the
relative contributions made by each party in creating the combined profits or losses. Relative
contributions must be determined in a manner that reflects the functions performed, risks assumed,
resources employed, and costs incurred by each party to the controlled transaction.53 A strength of
the transactional profit split method is that all relevant parties to the transaction are directly
evaluated as part of the pricing of the transaction; that is, the contributions of each party to the
48

Tinhaga supra note 42 at 131.
Ibid at 130.
50
Ibid at 132.
51
Elizabeth King, Transfer Pricing and Corporate Taxation: Problems, Practical Implications and Proposed
Solutions, (New York: Springer, 2009) at 12.
52
Tinhaga, supra note 42 at 132.
53
Ibid.
49
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transaction are specifically identified and their relative values measured in order to determine an
arm’s length compensation for each party in relation to the transaction.54 A profit split method is
particularly appropriate where there are significant intangibles being transferred between related
corporations.55
The transfer pricing methods that I have discussed here are alternatives that may, depending on
the facts, be applied to the various forms of transaction (goods, services and intangibles). A
taxpayer is at liberty to select any of these methods that it deems appropriate. The FIRS can,
however, accept or reject the taxpayer’s method if it deems that another method is more appropriate
for the transaction.56 I now focus on the subject of intangibles and the transfer pricing issues around
them, including the transfer pricing methods and valuation methods that may be applied to them.
3.2 Transfer Pricing and Intangibles
The relevance of intangibles to business success has been increasing since the 1970s.57 Intangibles
affect nearly every aspect of economic activity in the twenty-first century. They have become a
major source of sustainable competitive advantage for many firms.58 They are seen as the main
driver of value creation and a major source of sustainable competitive advantage for a majority of
multinationals, now more so than ever.59 In context, the five largest U.S. public companies in 2016
by market capitalization were Apple, Alphabet (Google), Microsoft, Exxon-Mobil, and Amazon
(companies that rely heavily on intellectual property); whereas, fifty years earlier, the top five by
the same measure were AT&T, IBM, General Motors, ExxonMobil, and Kodak.60 The information
and communication technology (ICT) revolution has made some technologies cheaper and more
powerful, enabling improvement of business processes and boosting innovation across virtually
all sectors of the economy.61 Depending on the structure and strategies of their businesses, MNEs
often share ideas, innovations, formulas, and so forth – some of which qualify as intangibles – that
are pertinent to the development of products or the furtherance of the business processes of the
See OECD, “Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional Profit Split Method: Inclusive Framework
on BEPS: Action 10, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 2018,” online:
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/revised-guidance-on-the-application-of-the-transactional-profit-split-method-beps-action10.pdf, para 2.122,
55
See Anita Anand & Kimberley Brooks, “The Allocation of Profits between Related Entities and the Oppression
Remedy: An Analysis of Ford Motor Co. V Omers,” (2004) 36:1 Ottawa L Rev 127 at 147.
56
See Prime Plastichem Nigeria Limited v Federal Inland Revenue Service [unreported] Appeal No.
TAT/LZ/CIT/015/2017: decided on 19 February 2020. (on file with the author).
57
Martin Lagarden, “Intangibles in a Transfer Pricing Context: Where Does the Road Lead?” (2014) 21:5 Intl Transfer
Pricing J 331.
58
United Nations, Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, “Update of the United Nations
Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries. Coordinator's Report on Work of the Subcommittee
on Transfer Pricing”, United Nations, (7 October 2016), online:
https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/12STM_CRP2_TransferPricing.pdf [UN TP Manual Update Report]
59
Mohamed Serokh, “Intangibles: Tax Risks and Opportunities for Multinational Groups,” PwC (9 April 2018),
online: https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/blog/intangibles-tax-risks-opportunities-multinational-groups-serokh.html
60
Alan J Auerbach, “Demystifying the Destination-Based Cash-Flow Tax”, (2017) 2017:2 Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 409, online: https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/article/688910/pdf, at 413.
61
UN TP Manual Update Report supra note 58.
54
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MNE. These intangible assets may include technical knowhow, patents, brand names, trademarks,
and goodwill.62 The increasing interconnectedness of the global economy underscores the need for
MNEs to deploy their intangible assets on a global scale to ensure that their subsidiaries’ operations
are aligned with those of the group, including the use of the headquarters’ technologies to boost
productivity of the local core activities.63 It also underscores the onus on tax authorities to ensure
that the inter-deployment of intangibles by MNEs is not used to mastermind unwholesome tax
avoidance. This is because given the high value often attached to intangibles, their use can induce
damaging outflows – from a tax perspective – if left unchecked.64 A case in point is
GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. v Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 65 In this case, a
pharmaceutical company and the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reached a 3.4 billion United
States dollars (USD) settlement66 after more than a decade of legal battle over the correct transfer
prices the company paid to its UK parent for several drugs. The battle was mainly over the value
of R&D versus marketing and selling expenses.
In Norway v Cytec Norway KS v Norway,67 the court was asked to determine whether Cytec
Norway KS (now Allnex Norway A/S) had paid an arm’s length price for an intra-group transfer
of intangibles (goodwill) in 2010. Cytec Norway KS had determined the price for the acquired
intangibles to be NOK210 million which it deemed deductible from its taxable income. The
Norwegian tax authorities found that no intangibles had been transferred and disallowed the
deduction. The Tax Appeals Committee determined that intangibles had been transferred but only
at a total value of NOK45 million. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Tax Appeals
Committee.
In an earlier case, Cytec Norge GP AS v Norway,68 the appellant transferred certain intangibles
(customer portfolio, technology, trademarks and goodwill) to a related entity, Cytec Industries
Europe (the Netherlands), apparently without compensation. The court found that Cytec Norge AS
held intellectual property rights of considerable value prior to is restructuring in 1999, and that the
Norwegian entity should have received an arm’s length compensation when these rights were
transferred to the related Dutch entity. The court, thus, upheld the Norwegian tax authorities’
calculation of remuneration and the increase of taxable income. An appeal to the Supreme Court
was dismissed in 2008.
Nigeria is one of many states trying to catch-up with the regulation of the transfer pricing of
intangibles. Neither TPR18 nor the statutes which it seeks to supplement defines the term
Victor Adegite & Nwakaego Ogueri-Onyeukwu, “Transfer Pricing and the Right to Use Intangibles in Nigeria: Is
the Arm’s-Length Principle at Risk?” (2019) Tax Notes Intl 137 at 138.
63
Ibid.
64
See Nestle Holdings Inc. v C.I.R. 152 F.3d 83 (1998); Medieval Attractions N.V v Commissioner 1996-455 (RIA)
3277.
65
117 T.C. No. 1 (2001).
66
Robert Guy Matthews & Jeanne Whalen, “Glaxo to Settle Tax Dispute with IRS Over U.S. Unit for $3.4 Billion,”
The Wall Street Journal (12 September 2006), online: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115798715531459461
67
LB 2017-90184.
68
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“intangible.”69 Thus, recourse must be had to external sources. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary of English Language defines the term “intangible” as “(business) that does not exist as
a physical thing but is still valuable to a company.”70 The same dictionary further describes
intangible as something “that exists but that is difficult to describe, understand or measure.”71 This
description, perhaps, best epitomizes the volatile character of intangibles and the special
challenges that they pose in the context of transfer pricing. Indeed, the OECD acknowledges that
difficulties can arise in a transfer pricing analysis as a result of definitions of the term intangible
that are either too narrow or too broad. If an overly narrow definition is applied, either taxpayers
or governments may argue that certain items fall outside the definition and may therefore be
transferred or used without separate compensation, even though such use or transfer would give
rise to compensation in transactions between independent enterprises. If too broad a definition is
applied, either taxpayers or governments may argue that the use or transfer of an item in
transactions between associated enterprises should require compensation in circumstances where
no such compensation would be provided in transactions between independent enterprises.72 A
case in point is Amazon Inc. & ors. v Commissioner of Internal Revenue.73 In this case, Amazon,
a US-based online retailer with highly profitable intangible assets, restructured its European
businesses in a way that would shift a substantial amount of its income from US-based entities to
newly created European subsidiaries between 2005 and 2006. Because the restructuring would
allow the European entities to generate income using Amazon’s pre-existing intangible assets
developed in the US, the US tax code and corresponding regulations required that the European
entities compensate Amazon for the use of assets that meet the regulatory definition of an
“intangible.” The compensation was provided through a cost sharing arrangement, whereby
Amazon and a holding company for the European subsidiaries would be treated as co-owners of
the intangibles. Under the arrangement, the holding company was required to make a “buy-in”
payment for the pre-existing intangibles Amazon contributed to the arrangement and to make cost
sharing payments going forward for its share of future research and development (R&D) efforts.
The buy-in payment was taxable income to Amazon, and the holding company’s cost sharing
payments would reduce Amazon’s US tax deductions for R&D costs. To guard against
manipulation by jointly controlled entities, the regulations required that the buy-in payment reflect
the fair market value of the pre-existing intangibles made available under a cost sharing

69

TPR18 seeks to regulate transfer pricing as contemplated in the Companies Income Tax Act, Cap C21 Laws of the
Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended); the Petroleum Profits Tax Act, Cap P13, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
2004 (as amended); the Personal Income Tax Act, Cap P8, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended), the
Capital Gains Tax Act, Cap C1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004; and the Value Added Tax Act, Cap V1 Laws
of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. See regulation 1.
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arrangement. Amazon initially reported a buy-in payment of about US$255 million. The Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) concluded that the buy-in payment had not been determined at arm’s length
and so performed its own calculation, valuing the buy-in at about US$3.6 billion. Amazon filed a
petition in the United States Tax Court challenging the IRS’s valuation. In the tax court
proceedings, Amazon and the Commissioner offered competing methods for valuing Amazon’s
pre-existing intangibles. While Amazon’s method isolated and valued only the specific intangibles
that it transferred to the European holding company under the cost sharing arrangement, including
website technology, trademarks, and customer lists, the IRS essentially valued the entire European
business, minus pre-existing tangible assets. The IRS’s method necessarily swept into the
calculation all contributions of value, including those that are more “nebulous and inseparable
from the business itself,” like the value of employees’ experience, education, and training (known
as “workforce in place”), going concern value, goodwill, and other unique business attributes and
expectancies (which the parties refer to as “growth options”). The tax court sided primarily with
Amazon, and the Commissioner appealed. The case required the Court of Appeal to interpret the
meaning of an “intangible” in the then applicable transfer pricing regulations. It was a question of
whether, as the Commissioner argued, the regulatory definition was broad enough to include all
intangible assets of value, even the more nebulous ones that the Commissioner referred to as
“residual-business assets” (i.e., Amazon’s culture of innovation, the value of workforce in place,
going concern value, goodwill, and growth options). The Court concluded that the definition did
not include residual-business assets. Although the language of the definition was ambiguous, the
drafting history of the regulations, according to the Court, showed that “intangible” was
understood to be limited to independently transferrable assets. The U.S. Court of Appeal for the
9th Circuit, thus, affirmed the decision of the U.S. Tax Court to the effect that the definition of
“intangible”, as it then was, did not include residual-business assets, and that the definition was
limited to independently transferrable assets.74
The OECD Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles defines an intangible
as "something which is not a physical asset or a financial asset, which is capable of being owned
or controlled for use in commercial activities, and whose use or transfer would be compensated
had it occurred in a transaction between independent parties in comparable circumstances." 75 This
74

This case was governed by regulations promulgated in 1994 and 1995. In 2009, more than three years after the tax
years at issue here, the Department of Treasury issued temporary regulations broadening the scope of contributions
for which compensation must be made as part of the buy-in payment. See 74 Fed. Reg. 340 (Jan. 5, 2009). In 2017,
the US Congress amended the definition of “intangible property” in 26 U.S.C. § 936(h)(3)(B) (which is incorporated
by reference in 26 U.S.C. § 482). Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, § 14221(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2218
(2017). The Court noted that if this case were governed by the 2009 regulations or by the 2017 statutory amendment,
there was no doubt that the Commissioner’s position would be correct. In other words, the case would have been
decided differently.
75
OECD Guidance on TP Aspects of Intangibles supra note 72, para 6.6. I take the view that by virtue of regulation
18 of TPR18 this definition could be the operative definition in Nigeria. Regulation 18 permits the FIRS to apply
transfer pricing guidance formulated by the UN and the OECD. So, in theory at least, this guidance may be deployed
by the tax authority even though it was subsequent to the TP Regulations. In Prime Plastichem Nigeria Limited v FIRS
supra note 44 – Nigeria’s first TP case – both parties, as well as the court, recognized the application of the OECD/UN
Guidelines in Nigeria.
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definition attempts to be all-encompassing, and it tries to allow room for the different tax rules and
interpretations in different countries.76 Broken down, the definition connotes that an intangible is
something which (1) is not a physical or financial asset; (2) is capable of being owned or controlled
for use in commercial activities; and (3) the use or transfer would be compensated had it occurred
in a transaction between independent parties under comparable circumstances.77 Lagarden has
identified certain qualities that can be used to identify intangibles. These include a lack of physical
substance (i.e. separation from tangible goods); non-monetary character (i.e. separation from
financial assets); identifiability (i.e. precondition for transfer); separability (i.e. precondition for
transfer); controllability (e.g. in contrast to certain local market features); future economic
relevance/utility (i.e. basic value criterion); and different conceivable forms of ownership.78
The OECD Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles states that intangibles that are
important to consider for transfer pricing purposes are not always recognised as intangible assets
for accounting purposes. For example, costs associated with developing intangibles internally
through expenditures such as research and development and advertising are sometimes expensed
rather than capitalized for accounting purposes and the intangibles resulting from such
expenditures therefore are not always reflected on the balance sheet. Such intangibles may
nevertheless be used to generate significant economic value and may need to be considered for
transfer pricing purposes. Furthermore, the enhancement to value that may arise from the
complementary nature of a collection of intangibles when exploited together is not always reflected
on the balance sheet. Accordingly, whether an item should be considered an intangible for transfer
pricing purposes under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention can be informed by its
characterization for accounting purposes but will not be determined by such characterization only.
Also, the determination that an item should be regarded as an intangible for transfer pricing
purposes does not determine or follow from its characterization for general tax purposes, as, for
example, an expense or an amortizable asset.79 It is also, perhaps, necessary to iterate that
intangibles are different from services (and vice versa) and should not be confused as such.
In Vodacom Business Nigeria Limited (Vodacom) v Federal Inland Revenue Service,80 the
Nigerian Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the Federal High Court81 to the effect that the supply
of satellite bandwidth capacities from a nonresident company to Vodacom, a Nigerian company,
was subject to Value Added Tax (VAT) in Nigeria. The court determined that the “service” was
supplied to a destination in Nigeria, thus taxable in Nigeria. Of course, the question of whether
bandwidth is indeed a service (or an intangible) was neither argued nor determined. However, by
the courts’ holding, it seems clear that bandwidth was subsumed as a service without the requisite
76
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consideration or distinction. The need for clarity is important because such characterisations can
have tax implications. For instance, in the Vodacom case, aforementioned, if the bandwidth
supplied was determined to be an intangible – as distinguished from a service – then perhaps, the
Value Added Tax Act would not have applied, since the Act only taxes the supply of “goods and
services.” It has been remarked, in response to the earlier Federal High Court decision in the
Vodacom case, that “Bandwidth is synonym for data transfer rate; it is the amount of data that can
be carried from one point to another in a given time. Greater bandwidth indicates greater capacity.
Bandwidth is invisible and so, is not goods. However, it is not human exertion, but data transfer
capacity, and so, would not qualify as service.”82 Incidentally, this argument was not under
consideration, so there is no knowing whether it would have affected the outcome. The case does,
however, reflect the importance of drawing those lines to avert unintended tax consequences.
Indeed, if comparisons are to be drawn, intangibles have all the salient economic characteristics of
goods and nothing in common with services.83 In the global economy their production and
distribution are organized in patently different ways from services. Treating them as services not
only obscures the real nature and economic significance of intangibles but also causes confusion
about the true characteristics of services.84
3.2.1 Classification of Intangibles
TPR18 does not classify intangibles, but intangibles are sometimes classed between trade
intangibles and marketing intangibles, between “soft” intangibles and “hard” intangibles, between
routine and non-routine intangibles, and between other classes and categories of intangibles.85
Moreover, intangibles (and IP) may be categorized with reference to contrasting terms, such as
“ground breaking (or break through)” as opposed to “me too” on one hand, or alternatively “ground
breaking (or break through)” versus “incremental”, on the other.86 This broad characterization
gains importance when companies are looking for relevant comparable data to assess and
document the arm’s length character of transactions involving their intangibles and IP, respective
prices or other conditions negotiated; the timing within the lifecycle of the intangibles when a
valuation is actually conducted; or the selection of an applicable valuation method “fit for the
purpose”.87 For the purpose of this paper, I will not dwell on such categorizations. I would,
Kingsley N Amaefule, “Vodacom v FIRS - Are intangibles goods, services or neither?” Ajumogobia & Okeke (18
March
2018),
online:
http://www.ajumogobiaokeke.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pdf-Newsletter-onIntangibles-Goods-services-or-neither.pdf
83
Peter Hill, “Tangibles, Intangibles and Services: A New Taxonomy for the Classification of Output,” (1999) 32:2
Canadian J Economics 426.
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however, note that intangibles are common in Nigeria and various forms are traded on the Nigerian
market, including the kinds listed by the OECD.88 The modes of trading in intangibles are
discussed in the next sub-paragraph.
3.2.2 Categories of Transactions
Cross-border transactions within multinational enterprises involving intangibles may be grouped
into three major categories, namely (i) acquisition or sale, (ii) licensing and (iii) R&D cost
sharing.89
a.

Licensing

Licensing involves the contractual right to use certain intangible, but without a transfer of
ownership in the intangible. Consequently, the licensor continues to be the legal owner of the
licensed intangible.90
b.

Research and Development (R&D) Cost Sharing

R&D cost sharing deals with the joint development and/or utilization of IP (and/or intangibles).91
This rather complex set-up creates several challenges, such as the valuation and pricing of preexisting relevant IP (and/or intangibles) when an R&D pool is formed for the first time, the pricing
of entry or exit fees for (potentially additional) pool participants over time, the establishment of
(an) arm’ s length allocation key(s) for ongoing R&D expenses incurred by pool members and also
the question of ownership of the IP that is newly created in the pool.92
c.

Acquisition or Sale

In an acquisition or sale, a transfer of ownership takes place. Before concluding the transaction,
an arm’s length price will be established, including a valuation or some kind of value estimation,
and be negotiated between the parties to the transaction.93
3.2.3 Determining Appropriate Remuneration for Intangibles
In determining the appropriate remuneration that is payable for a transaction in intangibles, TPR18
prescribes a guide that must be used by taxpayers and tax administrators. Sub-regulation 7(2) of
the Regulations provides as follows:
7(1) The determination of arm’s length conditions for controlled transactions involving the
exploitation of an intangible shall take into account the contractual arrangements and the
88

Intangibles mentioned by the OECD for transfer pricing purposes include patents; know-how and trade secret;
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note 72, paras 6.19–6.31.
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following factors with regard to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection
and exploitation of the intangible asset, the(a) Functions performed by the person;
(b) Management and control of those functions;
(c) Contribution by the person of assets, including financial assets;
(d) Management and control regarding the contribution of assets including financial assets;
(e) Risks assumed by that person; and
(f) Management and control of those risks.
The above provisions mirror the OECD’s recommendation that an analysis of cases involving the
use or transfer of intangibles should begin with a thorough comparability analysis, including a
functional analysis.94 The functional analysis should identify the functions performed, assets used,
and risks assumed by each relevant member of the MNE group; and in cases involving the use or
transfer of intangibles, it is especially important to ground the comparability and functional
analysis on an understanding of the MNE to add or create value across the entire supply chain.95
In other words, in order to determine arm’s length conditions for the use or transfer of intangibles
it is important to consider as part of the comparability and functional analysis: (i) the identification
of specific intangibles; (ii) the legal ownership of intangibles; (iii) the contributions of MNE group
members to their development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation; and (iv)
the nature of the controlled transactions involving intangibles including the manner in which such
transactions contribute to the creation of value, including the manner in which they interact with
other intangibles, with tangible assets and with business operations to create value. 96. On that
foundation, it is then necessary to consider the remuneration that would be paid between
independent parties in transactions involving intangibles.97 While it may be appropriate to
aggregate intangibles for the purpose of determining arm’s length conditions for the use or transfer
of the intangibles in certain cases, it is not sufficient to suggest that vaguely specified or
undifferentiated intangibles have an effect on arm’s length prices or other conditions. A thorough
functional analysis, including an analysis of the importance of identified relevant intangibles in
the MNE’s global business, should support the determination of arm’s length conditions.98 A good
functional analysis must also: fully understand the economics of the particular business and its
markets; aim to highlight the distinctiveness of the goods/services produced and the sensitivity of
demand to price; recognise invisible factors not evident from the accounts; and identify the relative
level of risk carried by the various group companies.99 The functional analysis is important as it
provides an overview of value creation within the supply chain in general and the related party
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transaction in particular.100 It provides an understanding of the relative contributions of the parties
to the transaction and their roles in overall value creation.101 It is not the volume of functions an
entity performs that is important for the analysis – it is the economic significance of those functions
in terms of their frequency, nature and value to the respective parties to the transactions. The
functions and their significance should be viewed in light of the value drivers of the business.102
The place of an efficient functional evaluation is highlighted by the US Court of Appeal’s decision
in Medtronic Inc. & Consolidated Subsidiaries v Commissioner of Internal Revenue.103 In this
case, the US Court of Appeal for the 8th Circuit vacated a decision of the Tax Court that had applied
the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method to a transfer pricing arrangement involving
intercompany licences between a US company and its Puerto Rico-based subsidiary. The IRS
argued that the Comparable Profit Method (similar to the Transactional Net Margin Method) was
applicable, while the appellant advocated the CUP. The Tax Court had held for the taxpayer, albeit
with modifications on the price. The Court of Appeal did not take a position on the best applicable
method, but based its decision to vacate and remand the case for further consideration on the
ground that the decision of the lower court was not founded on sufficient functional and
comparability analysis to determine the best method to be applied and the appropriate
comparability adjustments.
In another U.S. case, DHL Incorporated and Subsidiaries v Commissioner of Internal Revenue,104
involving the sale of intellectual property (DHL’s trademark) by DHL to DHL International
(DHLI), the IRS disagreed with DHL's evaluation of the arms-length price of the intellectual
property and reallocated income to DHL. DHL’s appeal to the Tax Court was dismissed. On
further appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court partly affirmed the Tax
Court's decision but reversed that part of it that rejected a $50million value of the foreign trademark
rights, as asserted by DHL. The court found that DHLI, formed shortly after DHL began
operations, was the only entity that moved packages out of the United States, and between all
foreign points; and that DHLI thus developed both the trademark in foreign countries and the
service network that was the foundation for the trademark. DHLI undertook the registration of the
“DHL” trademark in numerous foreign countries and bore essentially all related costs.
Furthermore, DHLI paid for all the overseas marketing campaigns with the “DHL” trademark.
According to the court, since developing a trademark includes advertising that mark, it does not
make sense to distinguish between typical marketing activity and development. On the basis of
these functions performed by DHLI, the court held that DHLI was the developer of the
“international trademark,” in which case no allocation to DHL for the value of the foreign
Kestutis Rudzika, “What is functional analysis?” RoyaltyRange
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101
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trademark rights was appropriate, or, alternatively, that DHLI provided assistance to DHL's
development, thereby entitling DHL to a complete set-off against the $50 million allocated to
DHLI.
A well-conducted functional analysis can enable both the tax authority and the court – in the case
of litigation – obtain a clear picture of who did what and who deserves to be compensated for what.
In the case of Switzerland vs S SA,105 the Swiss Federal Supreme Court upheld the disallowance
of intercompany royalty payments made by a Swiss company to its offshore parent company. The
Court agreed with the tax authority that the payments were not commercially justified because, as
the analysis showed, the offshore parent did not have the required substance to perform the
functions that would entitle it to any royalty payments. The parent company was not involved in
the group’s R&D activity and had no/very few employees. The parent company was not even the
legal owner of the assets as the patents were registered in the name of another group member,
based in France. This subsidiary (S SA) had 60 employees and made all the strategic decisions
over the R&D functions.
The functions considered under a functional analysis are development, enhancement, maintenance,
protection and exploitation (DEMPE).106 Development entails everything associated with coming
up with ideas for intangibles, and putting plans and strategies in place for their creation;
enhancement refers to continuing to work on aspects of intangibles to make sure they can perform
well at all times and continue to be improved; maintenance consists of actions that ensure
intangibles continue to perform well and generate revenue; protection entails ensuring that the
value of the intangible remains strong; and exploitation refers to the way in which intangibles are
used to generate profits.107 Performing or exercising control over the functions that contribute most
to value drivers has the biggest impact on overall value creation and, ultimately, profits from the
transaction.108 The functions performed and especially risks assumed can significantly affect the
profitability of the entity that performs the functions and assumes the risks.109 Further, it is
typically the case that the functions correlate with the risks and also impact the assets used. A
functional analysis is usually performed during a functional analysis interview meeting or call.110
Interviews and meetings provide a description of the material controlled transactions and the
context in which they take place.111 It also documents the functions performed, risks assumed and
assets used with respect to these transactions. The functional analysis provides the factual
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background and is used to establish the transfer pricing methodology based on the OECD’s transfer
pricing guidance.112
3.2.4 Selecting the Appropriate Pricing Method
After performing the functional analysis to determine the parties’ functional profiles, the
application of a transfer pricing method, with the associated evaluation of comparable transactions,
may be considered.113 This entails a selection of the transfer pricing methods – from those specified
in sub-regulation 5(1) TPR18 – that is most suitable in allocating remuneration to the ascertained
functions/risks. The selection/determination must take into account four factors. These are:
a) The strengths and weaknesses of the respective transfer pricing method in circumstances
of the case at hand;
b) The nature of the controlled transaction determined through an analysis of the functions,
assets and risk profiles of a party to the controlled transaction;
c) The availability of reliable information; and
d) The degree of comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions, including
the reliability of adjustments if any, that may be required to eliminate any differences
between comparable transactions.114
It should be noted that a taxpayer may, however, apply a method that is not listed in the TP
Regulations provided it can establish to the satisfaction of the tax authority that none of the listed
methods is workable in the circumstances; that the method used gives a result that is consistent
with the ALP; and that reliable information needed to apply the chosen method exists.115 These
conditions are cumulative; and whist a taxpayer has agency over what method to apply, the end
results must apportion remunerated on a function/asset/risk = reward basis. This means that a party
must not only nominally perform/bear, but actually control and be able to manage the
function/asset/risk for which it is compensated. More so, considering the provision of regulation
8 of TPR18, it is inferable that a capital rich low function entity that merely finances the
development of an intangible would only earn a risk-free return rather than the return from the
exploitation of the intangible.116 The tax authority has a duty to ensure that the a method overrule
is predicated on solid grounds and not on the basis of arbitrary exercise of administrative power.
As an illustration, in the U.S. case of Veritas Software Corp. v Commissioner,117 the plaintiff
entered into a cost-sharing transaction with its foreign subsidiary to develop and manufacture
storage management software products. Pursuant to this arrangement, the plaintiff granted the
112
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subsidiary the right to use certain preexisting intangibles overseas. As consideration for the transfer
of preexisting intangibles, the subsidiary made a $166 million buy-in payment to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff reached this outcome on the CUP method. The respondent rejected the sum received by
the plaintiff and employed an income method to determine the sum of $2.5 billion as the arm’s
length buy-in payment. This was subsequently revised to $1.675 billion by the respondent. The
respondent further determined that the requisite buy-in payment must take into account access to
the plaintiff’s team and the plaintiff’s distribution channels, customer lists, trademarks, trade
names, brand names and sales agreements. The United States Tax Court upheld the plaintiff’s
contention that the respondent’s determinations were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and
that the CUP method was the best method to calculate the requisite buy-in payment. The Court
also determined that in calculating the $1.675 billion allocation, the plaintiff relied on an
inapplicable law, used the wrong useful life for the products and the wrong discount rate and,
admittedly, did not know precisely which items were valued.
Sub-regulation 7(3) of TPR18 provides that “the determination of arm’s length conditions for
controlled transactions involving licenses, sales or transfers of intangible property between
connected persons shall take into account both the perspective of the transferor of the property
and the perspective of the transferee, including in particular the pricing at which a comparable
independent person would be willing to transfer the property and the value and usefulness of the
intangible property to the transferee in its business.” It seems, from the wording used, that there
is noticeable emphasis on comparability here.118 This supposes that the CUP method is the starting
point in deciding how to apportion remuneration from intangibles under TPR18. Essentially, the
reward to be received by a connected person for its ascertained function, asset and risk (FAR)
contribution to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and/or exploitation of an
intangible should be ascertained with recourse to what a person who makes similar contributions
in an uncontrolled transaction would ordinarily be entitled to. This requirement reflects the arm’s
length standard’s assumption that one can find market comparables as a benchmark against which
to measure the transfer price. While this may be achievable with tangible products (and even with
tangibles products there are difficulties), with intangible assets, arm’s length transactions occur
much less frequently or may simply not exist at all.119 The inherent weakness of the application of
the CUP method is the fact that most valuable intangibles are unique and might not meet the high
comparability standards, so some statistical adjustments to the benchmark might be needed to
improve the reliability of the results.120 More so a comparability test is not complete without
reference to sub-regulation 7(4) of TPR18 which provides that:
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in applying the provisions of sub-regulation (3)… to a transaction involving the license, sale
or other transfer of intangible property, consideration shall be given to any special factors
relevant to the comparability of the controlled transactions, including – (a) the expected
benefits from the intangible property; (b) the commercial alternatives otherwise available to
the acquirer or licensee derived from the intangible property; (c) any geographic limitations
on the exercise of rights to the intangible property; (d) the exclusive or non-exclusive
character of the rights transferred; and (e) whether the transferee has rights to participate in
further developments of the intangible property by the transferor.
The inclusion of the “special factors” consideration is a recognition of the fact that the pricing of
an intangible at a given time or place may be altered by peculiar circumstances surrounding the
transaction. They show that comparability is not determined only by reference to the intangible
property itself, but that regard must in each case be had to the surrounding circumstances.121
Differences in the surrounding circumstances between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions
may, therefore, limit the applicability of the CUP method notwithstanding that the intangibles
themselves appear to be similar or comparable ab initio. This situation further shrinks the usability
of the CUP, because of the difficulty of finding comparables that are that close. It also implies
that, for a country like Nigeria, it may be untenable to rely on “comparable” data from other
jurisdictions since the circumstantial differences may produce more of a grapes-versus-oranges
situation.
Like the CUP method, the RPM also suffers from overreliance on the availability of actual
comparables; which, as observed, are very difficult, if not impossible, to find. Further, the working
of this method gives it a relatively limited scope as the RPM is most often used for distributors
that resell products without physically altering them or adding substantial value to them. Current
economies, as indicated above rely as much on intangibles and alterations in the chain are common
practice.122 The Cost-Plus method is also limited in scope.123 The method is ordinarily used in
cases involving the manufacture, assembly, or other production of goods that are sold to related
parties. Cost Plus is most appropriate for the manufacturing and assembly industries.124 The
method also suffers from the malaise of overreliance on comparables since, like CUP, it is only
useful if there are comparables.125 If one is looking for actual references for transactions involving
intangibles as a valid reflection of the arm’s length principle, those examples should ideally be
derived from an observation of comparable transactions between independent parties in the
marketplace. This reservoir, however, provides scarce information and data, as intangibles are
rarely traded as such in active markets. Instead, these assets are much more often subject to
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transactions involving their combination with other tangible goods or services, between
independent and/or affiliated market participants.126
Doctoral scholar, Zachée Tinhaga, asserts that the main weakness of the TNMM is that it requires
a tremendous amount of available information in order to examine a wide range of reasonably
similar transactions for a reliable curve. Tax authorities have difficulties assembling this
information and big four accounting firms have established a de facto monopoly for these analysis
and charge a considerable amount for their services.127 Neither can small companies (since they
cannot afford the services of the accounting firms) and tax authorities do not have all the necessary
information to potentially challenge the position taken by MNEs of a transfer price reasonably
comparable to the open market price.128 These weaknesses are recognised by the OECD which has
admonished that one-sided methods such as the resale price method and the TNMM, are generally
not reliable methods for directly valuing intangibles as they usually allocate all residual profit,
after a limited return to those providing the relevant functions, to the owner of intangibles.129
It has been suggested, as a robust alternative to the CUP method, that an economic valuation
approach called Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method can be used.130 This method seeks to project
the contribution of intangibles to the excess profits of the licensee over the useful life or the license
period and discount it to the present value. That will result in a lump sum amount more useful for
outright sale of intangibles as opposed to license arrangements.131 Bamfo & Akinsulire, Nigerian
tax consultants, opine that although this approach has strong technical merits, it faces practical
challenges such as reasonableness of key input parameters such as the growth rates used in the
projections, the discount rate and the useful life of the intangibles.132 These could all be contentious
points between the taxpayer and the tax authority.
The OECD, through its Guidance for Tax Administration on the Application of the Approach to
Hard-to-Value Intangibles (the HTVI Guidance), presents an alternative way of pricing intangibles
in the absence of comparables. The HTVI Guidance was issued in June 2018 shortly after the birth
of TPR18 and further to Action 8 of the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.133 The
HTVI Guidance defines the term “Hard-to-value Intangibles” as those intangibles for which (i) no
reliable comparables exist, and (ii) at the time the transactions was entered into, the projections of
future cash flows or income expected to be derived from the transferred intangible, or the
assumptions used in valuing the intangible are highly uncertain, making it difficult to predict the
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level of ultimate success of the intangible at the time of the transfer.134 It has been observed that
this definition can be construed as being overly broad and may comprehend almost any
intangible.135 Examples of an HTVI include an intangible that is partially developed at the time of
the transfer or an intangible that is used or developed under a cost contribution arrangement. 136
The solution presented by the HTVI Guidance is that in the above circumstances the tax authority
may consider “ex post outcomes” as presumptive evidence about the appropriateness of the exante pricing arrangements.137 This process allows the tax authority to re-characterize transfers of
intangibles using presumptions based upon alternative – even hypothetical – ex post pricing
arrangements to determine ex ante value.138 Put differently, in a case like this, the tax authority
may use the actual results (i.e. profit or loss) obtained from exploiting the relevant intangible in
assessing the arm’s-length price at the time the transaction occurred.139 If there is a major deviation
between the realized results (i.e. profit or loss) and the expectations (and resulting prognosis) that
formed the basis for the determination of the price of the HTVI at the moment of the license or
transfer and this deviation cannot be explained on the basis of facts and circumstances occurring
after the date of the price determination, the tax authority can question the price as determined at
the time of the transaction with a reference to the actually realized results.140 This is, perhaps, the
most far-reaching tool in the hand of the tax authority as far as readjusting the price of intangibles
is concerned. It appears, however, that this approach is meant to be a last resort which may not be
invoked where the taxpayer can satisfactorily demonstrate what was foreseeable at the time of the
transaction and reflected in the pricing assumptions, and that the developments leading to the
difference between projections and outcomes arose from unforeseeable or extraordinary events.
Where this is the case, the HTVI Guidance “takes away” the power of tax administrations to adjust
the ex ante pricing arrangements based on ex post outcomes.141 Further, the HTVI approach may
134
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not be applied where: the transaction is covered by a bilateral or a multilateral advance pricing
agreement (APA); the difference between the ex ante projections and the ex post outcomes is less
than 20%; or five years of commercialization have elapsed since the year in which the HTVI first
generated third-party revenue for the transferee.142 The HTVI approach allows tax authorities to
make appropriate adjustments – including adopting alternative or different pricing structures for
the transaction, such as milestone payments, running royalties, price adjustment clauses, or a
combination of pricing structures.143 Because no reliable comparable intangibles exist in case of
HTVI, references to pricing structures used in transactions between unrelated parties likely will
not be available.144 The Guidance stops short, however, in indicating how and on what basis a tax
authority should make such pricing adjustment and therefore could be subject to subjective
interpretation and to arbitrariness.145 A major criticism of the HTVI approach is that it can, in
practice, lead to uncertainty and unpredictability, particularly for taxpayers.146 At the same time,
it will open up avenues for disputes between taxpayers and tax authorities or between tax
authorities when called upon to give relief under a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment. This
is in particular a concern as the Guidance does not delineate clear boundaries of what could be
considered satisfactory evidence, nor does it clarify the subjective terminology and language used
in the Guidance such as ‘unforeseeable’ or ‘extraordinary.’147 Also, there is a risk that the tax
authority may take the ‘easy’ option of always hinging on the outcomes whenever favourable, even
if those outcomes may appear to result from unforeseen or unexpected events. After all, the onus
to prove – to the satisfaction of the tax authority – that the outcomes were unforeseen or unexpected
rests on the taxpayer. The approach, thus, becomes the go-to option rather than the (intended)
exceptional option. MNEs that do not want the valuation of their transactions to be open for expost adjustments must therefore provide evidence that they have properly considered ex-ante
uncertainties.148 When these uncertainties are reflected in the original valuation, ex-post
adjustment should simply not be justified, since deviations were then already accounted for.149
One method to reflect the uncertainties and improve ex-ante valuations are scenario building
techniques that go beyond ordinary discount cash-flows.150 Such methods that may be used to deal
the difference between the ex post outcome and the ex-ante pricing arrangement, it can be said that there was no
information asymmetry.
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with the specific risks related to the development of HTVI include real option pricing, which is
supported by Monte Carlo simulations, and the binomial tree analysis. All these methods are based
on not just assuming a single prediction of a future income, but explicitly looking at different
scenarios, which range from failure to better-than-expected.151 MNEs may also make their
contracts subject to actual income basis, although this may not necessarily take care of the potential
exposure to double taxation of at least one party to the transaction.
3.2.5 Other Government Agencies Price Approvals?
Perhaps another way that the FIRS could ascertain arm’s length pricing for intangibles would be
to rely on technology transfer prices approved by other agencies of government for the transfer of
intangibles between related Nigerian and foreign entities. Incidentally, the FIRS’ approach in this
regard has proved somewhat controversial. Prior to the introduction of TPR12, now TPR18, the
National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) had specific guidelines for
recognizing technology transfer agreements between foreign licensors and Nigerian licensees.152
NOTAP also has approved a range of fees/royalties Nigerian licensees were permitted to pay the
foreign owners and licensors for use of the licensed commercial and industrial intangible property
rights (IP rights).153 The FIRS has in the past (before the establishment of the transfer pricing
regulations) relied on NOTAP approved rates to demonstrate that the pricing of these related-party
transactions was reasonable.154 Thus, taxpayers have often sought NOTAP approvals for certainty
in the FIRS’s treatment of the reasonableness of the approved rates for tax purposes. Since the era
of TPR12, however, the FIRS has questioned the validity of payments made to related parties,
especially for imported items, including intangibles, despite NOTAP approval.155 The tax authority
requires a taxpayer to adduce proof of valuation methods used and analysis performed in
determining royalty rates, fees and commissions being paid for licensed IP rights.156 If a taxpayer
is unable to demonstrate that a connected transaction has been concluded and executed in
accordance with the arm's length principle, the tax authority may opt to disallow the expense for
tax purposes despite the prior approval and certification by NOTAP.157 The FIRS’s view is that
NOTAP does not apply standard transfer pricing principles to determine the fees approved and
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thus can approve fees that are not arm’s length.158 This stance is not altogether surprising since the
NOTAP (and Central Bank of Nigeria) guidelines were seen as focused on imposing foreign
currency control and restrictions on sourcing of foreign exchange from the government. 159 There
are, however, concerns with this administrative approach. Firstly, it has been claimed that where
the government agencies such as NOTAP’s approved rate will result in less tax being paid, the
FIRS will rely more on the arm’s length principle, and vice versa. 160 This policy of inconsistency
leaves the taxpayer in a perpetual guessing game which does not make for good tax planning or
tax administration. Moreover the uncertainty induced by this approach runs contrary to Nigeria’s
National Tax Policy.161 One way of mitigating or eliminating the ambiguity problem is to ensure
that both government agencies – the FIRS and NOTAP – use the arm’s length principle in
determining appropriate prices or rates for related-party transactions.162 Alternatively, the FIRS
may consider revising the safe harbor provision in the transfer pricing regulations to state that
approved rates by other government regulatory agencies should suffice and need not meet the
arm’s length principle.163 Rather unfortunately this issue has been on since TPR12 but remains
unattended despite the issuance of TPR18.
3.2.6 Contributory Development
The OECD’s Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional Profit Split Method (“the
TPSM Guidance”) posits that the TPSM is the ideal profit allocation method in a transaction
between connected persons where one or more of the following indicators exists:
1) Each party makes unique and valuable contributions;
2) The business operations are highly integrated such that the contributions of the parties
cannot be reliably evaluated in isolation from each other;
3) The parties share the assumption of economically significant risks, or separately assume
closely related risks.164
The TPSM is particularly useful when the compensation to the associated enterprises can be more
reliably valued by reference to the relative shares of their contributions to the profits arising in
relation to the transaction(s) than by a more direct estimation of the value of those contributions.165
The OECD asserts that in some cases, the TPSM may be the most appropriate method for a transfer
of fully or partially developed intangibles where it is not possible to identify reliable comparable
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uncontrolled transactions.166 The main strength of the TPSM is that it can offer a solution for cases
where both parties to a transaction make unique and valuable contributions (e.g. contribute unique
and valuable intangibles) to the transaction. In such a case independent parties might effectively
price the transaction in proportion to their respective contributions, making a two-sided method
more appropriate.167 Further, since those contributions are unique and valuable there will be no
reliable comparables information which could be used to price the entirety of the transaction in a
more reliable way, through the application of another method. In such cases, the allocation of
profits under the TPSM may be based on the contributions made by the associated enterprises, by
reference to the relative values of their respective functions, assets and risks.168
Despite its perceived strengths as a method, the OECD cautions that TPSM should not be used
where there are comparables, albeit limited.169 The TPSM Guidance also makes clear that while a
lack of comparables is, by itself, insufficient to warrant the use of the profit split method, if,
conversely, reliable comparables are available it is less likely that the method will be the most
appropriate.170 It would seem therefore that in some cases that even a limited scope of comparable
uncontrolled data may be a more reliable option for meeting the arm’s length standard than the
TPSM.171 This raises significant doubts about the reliability of this method and presents it more as
a makeshift solution to a complex problem. Also, the TPSM relies on internal data of the
companies in the controlled transaction.172 This could prove problematic, especially to the tax
authority, where “sufficient” internal data is not readily available. Perhaps such paucity may be
ameliorated – but to what extent – with the stricter information filing requirements now prescribed
especially under the Country-by-Country Reporting Regulations. It seems also that even with
available information, identifying the appropriate profit splitting factors can also be challenging.173
3.2.7 The 5% Expense Deductibility Rule
TPR18 adopts the African Tax Administrators Forum (ATAF) Approach, that seeks to provide
African countries with simplified policy measures to address capacity constraints that make it
difficult to price complex controlled transactions, such as those involving the transfer of rights
relating to intangibles.174 One of such simplification measures is contained in sub-regulation 7(5).
It provides that:
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Notwithstanding any other provision of these Regulations, where a person engages in any
transaction with a related person that involves the transfer of rights in an intangible, other
than the alienation of an intangible, the consideration payable in that transaction that is
allowable for deduction for tax purposes shall not exceed 5% of the earnings before the
interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation and that consideration, derived from the commercial
activity conducted by the person in which the rights transferred are exploited.
It is not unusual for MNEs to vest legal ownership of an intangible in a subsidiary resident in a
low tax jurisdiction and then license the use of the intangible to another subsidiary or parent
resident in a high tax jurisdiction. This way profit is shifted from the high tax jurisdiction to the
low tax jurisdiction through huge royalty payments.175 It would seem that the above provision
seeks to curb profit shifting through licensing and payment of royalties by “arbitrarily” limiting
the incentive to pay huge compensations to a nonresident related company for the exploitation of
an intangible in a case other than an outright alienation. Although the provision does not preclude
a Nigerian taxpayer from paying more than 5% of its earnings before interest, tax, depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA) to, for instance, the licensor of an intangible, if the amount paid does
exceed 5% of the income earned from the relevant commercial activity, the Nigerian taxpayer
would not be allowed to deduct more than a sum equal to the specified percentage as an expense
in computing its tax liabilities in Nigeria. This looks like a strong anti-avoidance provision; and
also one that makes for administrative simplicity. In terms of administrative simplicity, a provision
such as this offers the Nigerian tax authority, which is, presumably, in a weaker position to
determine appropriate arm’s length royalty payments, a way to forestall the potential revenue
losses that may otherwise arise from such payments. There are, however, some issues with the
provision. When the TPR was issued, the 5% deductibility limit appeared to be at variance with
the provisions of superior legislation or statute. For instance, the corporate expense deductibility
rule as prescribed under section 24 of CITA provides that:
Save where the provisions of subsection (2) or (3) of section 14 or 16 of this Act apply, for
the purpose of ascertaining the profits or loss of any company of any period from any source
chargeable with tax under this Act, there shall be deducted all expenses for that period by
that company wholly, exclusively, necessarily and reasonably incurred in the production of
those profits including, but without otherwise expanding or limiting the generality of the
foregoing…
The above provision goes on to outline certain specific expenses that may be deducted, and in
specific cases prescribes deductibility caps. The established position of the law is that any expense
that is wholly, exclusively, necessarily and reasonably incurred in producing income qualifies for
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deduction and the courts have traditionally upheld this position.176 There was nothing in CITA, for
instance, that placed a quantitative limit on the deductibility of expenses incurred as payments for
intangibles. The test of deductibility, traditionally, rests on whether the sum sought to be deducted
was expended on an (intangible) asset that aided the taxpayer to generate the profit sought to be
taxed.177 Based on this rule, if the expense directly or indirectly contributes to the generation of
profits for the company, then it should be allowable in its entirety as a tax expense.178 It was
questionable, therefore, whether TPR18, a subsidiary legislation, could impose such a limit,
especially as Nigerian courts have consistently taken the position that a subsidiary legislation
cannot override the provision of a primary legislation.179 In Mobil Producing (Nig.) Unltd v
Johnson, for instance, the Supreme Court of Nigeria made this point as follows:
A subsidiary or subordinate legislation and its provisions must be consistent with the
principal legislation from which it derives its life. Where the substantive legislation is not
complied with, there is no basis to consider the subordinate legislation on the issue because
any subordinate legislation which is inconsistent with the principal legislation, is a nullity to
the extent of its inconsistency. The Force Administrative Instruction/Force order is a
subsidiary legislation which derives its validity from the Police Act, its provisions and
directives, therefore, must be in conformity with the terms of its enabling law in order to
make it valid.180
In the light of these authorities, the validity of sub-regulation 7(5) was questionable, although one
could argue that with this provision the FIRS was merely exercising its broad power to take antiavoidance measures, as authorised by the relevant anti-avoidance rules.181 Thus, the provision only
seeks to forestall profit shifting perpetrated by overpaying royalty to subsidiaries in tax favourable
jurisdictions. Such an assertion is not without counterarguments, however.182 The Nigerian policy
makers moved to cure this lacuna through the recently enacted Finance Act 2019.183 Section 11 of
the Finance Act has amended section 27(1) of CITA by inserting a new paragraph (g) that disallows
“any expense incurred within or outside Nigeria involving related parties as defined under the
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Transfer Pricing Regulations, except to the extent that it is consistent with the Transfer Pricing
Regulations.” With this amendment, the validity of sub-regulation 7(5) of TPR18 vis-à-vis CITA
now appears unquestionable.
There is a subsisting concern that sub-regulation 7(5) of TPR18 creates a discriminatory tax system
where taxpayers are treated differently on the basis of whom they do business with. Given that the
deductibility cap only applies to taxpayers in controlled transactions, an inequity may be created
in “favour” of taxpayers in uncontrolled transactions. In that sense, taxpayers who license
intangibles from connected parties would be arbitrarily restricted in deducting their expenses
irrespective of whether they trade at arm’s length. On the other hand, taxpayers who license
intangibles as independents can deduct their full expenses even if in excess of 5% of EBITDA.
Critics also criticize the use of EBITDA as a deduction benchmark. One commentator observes
that in transactions involving the transfer of intangibles between independent parties, the base over
which the pricing is calculated is usually revenue, turnover, or profit before tax. This is largely
because intangibles often drive revenue; and it is, therefore, questionable to use EBITDA as a base
reference in regulation 7(5), especially because the value it attributes to the intangibles would be
significantly distorted.184 EBITDA, it is opined, is susceptible to major fluctuations and thus poses
a problem year-over-year because it would not adequately portray the value that the intangible
brings to the company.185 Deductibility should, ideally, be determined by actual contribution of an
intangible to the bottomline.
The preceding segments of this paper showcase the difficulties that confront method selection and
pricing determination for intangibles under arm’s length pricing. It is noted that while the tax
authority is at liberty to question a pricing method chosen by the taxpayer and to make a reselection and/or readjustment accordingly, the tax authority must also be ready to demonstrate that
whatever method it chooses is the appropriate method. In other words, the tax authority cannot
choose arbitrarily or capriciously simply because it does not agree with the outcome produced by
the method selected by the taxpayer. Failure to abide by these principles may have severe
repercussions for the bottom line, as some of the cases herein have demonstrated.186
4.

Conclusion
“Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our
central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time
as far as our planet is concerned.”187
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Taxing MNEs has always been a difficult and complex task. Globalization is making it more so.188
This complexity is only heightened by the ever-increasing integration of intangibles in the business
of MNEs and the risk of unwholesome outflows in controlled transactions. States are left with no
choice but to initiate proactive measures to ensure that intangibles and other inter-company assets
are traded in a fiscal compliant manner. Despite its obvious, if not brazen, imperfections, and
numerous calls for its replacement, it does not seem that the arm’s length principle is anywhere
near demise and may remain the anchor of international tax regulation for the foreseeable future.
For developing countries like Nigeria, the burden of dealing with the web of abstraction that is
transfer pricing rules is heavier. There is a recognised dearth of publicly available data from which
local comparables can be drawn for benchmarking analysis because of the lack of a centralized
database. Thus, taxpayers and the FIRS have, generally, had to rely on comparables from other
jurisdictions in Africa, Asia, Europe and America.189 Of course, even where seemingly
comparable data can be found, they must also be put through the acid tests of circumstanciality.190
This is apart from the general capacity constraints which make it difficult to price complex
transactions.191 Even for taxpayers, the transfer pricing audit process is extremely tedious and
cumbersome. The volume of documents requested by the tax authority to enable it to understand
the facts of each case is enormous;192 and the tax authority may also conduct strenuous interviews
and document reviews.193 This is neither ideal for the taxpayer nor for a tax authority with limited
competent tools. More so when there are no guarantees that the most diligent TP audit process
would produce the most accurate of results.
There is a discernible consensus that the international tax order is flawed and requires some
surgical reconfiguration. These flaws are not limited to transfer pricing. Neither are they
constrained to the specific problem of pricing intangibles. Issues dominating the international tax
debate include the suitability/viability of present tax treaty models194 and the migraine of digital
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taxation.195 In nearly all cases the contention is wrapped around the forms and degrees of
reconfiguration. In terms of the specific issues discussed in this paper, while some favour a
tweaking of the existing order, some favour an overhaul. So far, most of the concrete actions taken
– led by the OECD – appear to favour the former. A reasonable solution is not simple, especially
as increased efforts by governmental units to impose restrictions are immediately countered by
increased efforts by tax planners to reduce taxes by circumventing those restrictions.196 For those
who favour an overhaul, there has been no shortage of suggestions. From formulary
apportionment197 to destination-based cash flow tax198 to minimum taxation to intellectual property
rights approaches.199 While the debate persists, Nigeria – unable to act unilaterally – must adopt
and develop rules, institutions and actors under the incumbent ALP framework to tackle transfer
mispricing. From a legal perspective, Nigeria’s tax statutes should be updated, where need be, to
match the trends of combating transfer mispricing. It is comforting to see that CITA has been
amended to legitimize some of the seemingly ultra vires provisions in the TP regulations. From
an institutional angle, significant investment in revenue collection expertise and facilities is
advocated. Facilities would include databases that identify royalty percentages and sale prices, for
(near) comparability purposes. Of course, recruitment and training of a wider array of competent
TP specialist personnel is a sine qua non. There must also be collaborative engagement with other
cooperative states. Having regard to the uniqueness of the intangibles problem, highlighted in this
paper, just how far these measures can go is hard to tell. What is easier to tell is that intangibles
will continue to be integral to the way life is lived and the globalization of business. Such
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developments can only further blur the inter-state lines that exist between related corporations in
the context of cross-border business. They will, perhaps, demystify the “illusion” that MNEs are
separate in their legal and economic identities. As Professors Avi-Yonah and Benshalom observe,
there is already a noticeable integration of formulary apportionment elements into transfer pricing
regulation.200 Perhaps this is indicative of a march towards a more globe-centric tax future; a global
(tax) village through the lenses of Marshall McLuhan. Perhaps not.
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